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Abstract
This paper analyzes the phenomenon of strategic technology alliances. It is proposed that the concept of small worlds, which
has been adopted from mathematical graph theory, is a useful model to combine two theoretical streams that have previously
analyzed this phenomenon. These are the theory of social capital and the theory of structural holes. We outline a small worlds
model, and apply it to data on strategic technology alliances. We ﬁnd that networks of strategic technology alliances can indeed
be characterized as small worlds, and that this has favorable implications for knowledge transfer. There are, however, also important
differences between two different technology ﬁelds that we consider: chemicals and food, and electricals.
 2002 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In the past decades, strategic alliances have become
an important mechanism for (quasi) external acquisition
of technological know-how. The strong upheaval in the
use of strategic technology alliances has led to the
emergence of complex inter-organizational research net-
works. The growing strategic importance of these net-
works has been acknowledged in many contributions
(see, e.g., Burt, 1992; Gulati, 1998; Duysters and Hage-
doorn, 2002). The quest for a better understanding of
these networks subsequently led to the use sophisticated
network analysis techniques and conceptions arising
from graph theory for the analysis of these networks,
both from the point of view of policy and strategic man-
agement within ﬁrms (Vonortas, 1997).
Recently, the theory of ‘small worlds’ has emerged in
the ﬁeld of graph theory (Watts, 2000; Cowan and Jon-
ard, 2000). This paper will attempt to apply this theory
to the case of sectoral technology alliance networks. It
will be argued that the theory of small worlds can be
seen as a model that unites two distinct perspectives
found in the strategic management literature. These are
the notions of social capital and structural holes (Walker
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et al., 1997). Using the small-worlds idea in this way, it
is argued here that one may use this concept as a way to
judge the overall efﬁciency of a network of technology
alliances. This argument is applied to empirical data on
two major RTD networks.
The next section of this paper will brieﬂy review the
social capital and structural holes theory of network for-
mation as it is found in the strategic management litera-
ture. In Sect. 3 we formulate two speciﬁc research ques-
tions and we outline the theory of small worlds, and
argue how it can be applied to the theory discussed in
Sect. 2. Section 4 will present the empirical results. The
argument will be summarized and concluded in Sec-
tion 5.
2. Strategic technology alliances and networks
One of the key trends over the past decades has been
the remarkable growth in the number of strategic
alliances (see Fig. 1). According to many authors, this
trend is likely to continue in the near future. Major con-
sultancy organizations such as Booz–Allen Hamilton
(2000) predict that within ﬁve years from now, the value
of alliances will be in the range of $30–$50 trillion.
The rapid proliferation of alliances is in large part due
to an increase in the number of strategic technology
alliances (Hagedoorn, 1996; Duysters and Hagedoorn,
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Fig. 1. Number of newly established strategic alliances per year (1985–2000), three-year moving averages. Source: Thomson Financial.
on the internal development of know-how and new tech-
nology, ﬁrms have come to realize that internal develop-
ment is no longer sufﬁcient to deal with their continu-
ously changing technological environment. A growing
number of ﬁrms seems to recognize that the use of stra-
tegic technology alliances allows them to increase their
ﬂexibility and to tap into other company’s technologi-
cal resources.
The growth in the number of strategic technology
alliances has led to the emergence of complex “tech-
nology networks”. The growing importance of these net-
works induced a shift of focus in the alliance literature,
away from a dyadic relationship level towards a network
perspective. Firms which are “embedded” in these net-
works are increasingly affected by the relationships of
their partners and the overall structure of the network
(Granovetter, 1992). Embeddedness, on the one hand,
restrains ﬁrms in their behavior and on the other hand
creates opportunities for companies to tap into rich
resources.
The central notion in the network literature is what
Nooteboom (1999) has coined indirect access. Because
an alliance partner is also likely to be connected to
others, a ﬁrm does not only gain access to resources of
its immediate partner, but also, to a certain extent, to
those with whom the partner collaborates. The issue of
partner-seeking then becomes one of picking partners
not only on the basis of their own capabilities and
resources, but also those of the indirect actors it gives
(partial) access to in terms of its network.
This gives rise to the idea of a set of strategic alliances
as a network of actors that are directly or indirectly con-
nected to each other. A direct connection results from
participation in a speciﬁc alliance. Indirect connections
result when information or knowledge exchanged in one
partnership is also (implicitly) entered in other partner-
ships. Such networks have been the topic of the math-
ematical branch of graph theory, and have been studied
since the 1950s (Watts, 2000 provides a brief overview
of the history of the ﬁeld). A crucial element in this
theory is the structure of the network and the position
that actors occupy in them.
The focus on the importance of indirect ties gave rise
to two different perspectives on the dynamics governing
the formation of networks and their efﬁciency as infor-
mation or knowledge transmitters.
The ﬁrst perspective emphasizes the importance of
social capital (Bourdieu, 1980; Coleman, 1990). Social
capital can be deﬁned as “the sum of the resources,
actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group
by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or
less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaint-
ance and recognition” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992,
as cited by Walker et al., 1997, p. 109). Putting the con-
cept of social capital in a network context, Walker et al.
have argued that the density of network relations is a
good proxy: “Some ﬁrms occupy positions that are
embedded in regions ﬁlled with relationships, indicating
a high level of available social capital, but other pos-
itions are located in regions with few relationships, sug-
gesting a low social capital” (Walker et al., 1997, p.
111). In general, one can argue that ﬁrms with more
social capital will have access to a larger pool of infor-
mation sources and will be able to attract better partners
(Gulati, 1998).
The second perspective on networks stems from the
work by Burt (1992), who argued that a ﬁrm interested
in using networks as a source of information should
attempt to ﬁll the structural holes in between the dense
areas of a network rather than replicate existing partner-
ships that are already in place. In other words, in strategi-
cally selecting one’s partners for cooperation, one should
look for partners that have strong links to other actors
with whom oneself does not yet have strategic links, in
order to try to bridge holes in one’s own network. From
this perspective, the primary strategic aim of forming
partnerships becomes the desire to serve as ‘bridges’
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Burt (1992) argues that this strategy will provide access
to knowledge or information that has a high yield. The
roots of this perspective can be found in social network
literature that emphasizes the importance of “weak ties”
and the importance of overarching structural holes.
McEvily and Zaheer (1999) have argued that bridging
ties are characterized by:
 Non-redundancy, operationalized as the degree to
which the contacts in a ﬁrms ego network are not
linked to one another.
 Infrequency of interaction with the partners.
 Geographic dispersion — the more distant, the more
non-redundant.
Overall, Burt argues that redundant contacts often
carry the same information. Therefore, organizations
should focus on establishing non-redundant contacts that
enable ﬁrms to bridge dense areas in the network.
Confronting these two perspectives, one can clearly
see two distinct tendencies emerging. Strategies built
solely on the idea of enhancing social capital would lead
to networks with highly dense local environments.
When, on the other hand, in an extreme case, ﬁrms
mainly try to pursue a strategy of ﬁlling structural holes
in their own network, a tendency towards less densely
connected local environments would result.
3. Research question and theory
3.1. Research question
Intuitively, the ‘social capital strategy’ and the ‘struc-
tural holes strategy’ will lead to quite different networks
of strategic technology alliances. Firms dominated by a
‘social capital’ view of the world will seek out a limited
number of partners with whom they build strong and
repeated ties. This will result in an overall network struc-
ture in which local environments of a ﬁrm are densely
populated with alliances, but where path length to other
local environments is long. Alternatively, in a world
dominated by strategies aimed at bridging ‘structural
holes’, local environments will tend to be populated less
densely, while paths through the network will tend to
be shorter.
This intuitive argument would suggest that there is
some degree of trade-off involved between social capital
(density of network) and path length, where higher social
capital leads to longer paths. We will use a simple model
presented by Watts (2000) in order to investigate the
nature of this trade-off. The model will show that there
is a particular class of networks, which are known in the
literature as small worlds, in which relatively high social
capital can go hand in hand with relatively short path
length. The mechanism involved in shaping the network
as a small world will be the existence of so-called short-
cuts in the network. We will relate this concept to the
notion of bridge-building in Burt’s theory.
Our second research question is how actual networks
of strategic technology alliances compare to our hypo-
thetical network structures. In other words, we will
investigate whether these actual networks resemble one
of our extreme network structures (social capital world,
or world dominated by bridges to cover structural holes),
or whether they can be classiﬁed as a small world. In
this way, we will be able to put a value on the relative
efﬁciency of the whole network as a generator of social
capital, or as a transmitter of information and knowl-
edge. Our special interest will be in ﬁnding differences
in this respect between different technology ﬁelds, or
over time.
3.2. Concepts and deﬁnitions
1
In order to describe our two extreme cases, two central
concepts will sufﬁce. These are the concepts of charac-
teristic path length of a network, and that of clustering.
An assumption in our treatment of the concepts and the
theory hereafter will be that we deal with a network in
which all nodes are connected through each other
(directly or indirectly), i.e., that there are no parts of
the network that are unconnected to other parts. In our
empirical applications below, we will construct the net-
work by deﬁning a direct link to be present if two ﬁrms
participate in at least one alliance together.
For any pair of actors in the networks, deﬁne the path
length between them as the minimum number of inter-
mediaries necessary to connect them, plus one. It follows
from this deﬁnition that actors that are directly connected
have a path of length of one between them. Two actors
that are not directly connected, but share a third ﬁrm as
a direct connection, have path length equal to two, etc.
The particular indicator that has been used in much
theoretical work in order to arrive at a single measure
of path length for the network as a whole is called
characteristic path length. This is deﬁned as the median
of average path length of all actors in the network. Aver-
age path length of an actor is deﬁned as the average of
path length to all other actors in the network.
Characteristic path length of the network is interesting
because it gives an indication of the relative (potential)
efﬁciency of the network. The shorter path length in a
network, the easier and quicker knowledge or infor-
mation may diffuse through the network. Form the point
of view of a single actor in the network, shorter path
length implies easier access to the knowledge of other
actors in the network.
Characteristic path length will depend on a number
1 The exposition here draws heavily on Watts (2000).566 B. Verspagen, G. Duysters / Technovation 24 (2004) 563–571
of network characteristics. The number of actors in the
network is one prime determinant, as is the average num-
ber of direct connections that each actor has (the latter
is called average degree of the network). In addition to
these quantities, which can be easily measured for any
network, it is the network topology that determines
characteristic path length. A prime factor of interest with
regard to network topology is the way in which the edges
are distributed over the network as a whole.
The concept of network clustering can be used to
quantify some interesting factors in network topology.
In order to deﬁne network clustering, one must ﬁrst
deﬁne the neighborhood of actor i. The term will be used
to describe the subset of actors that have a direct connec-
tion to actor i (this is also called ego network of actor
i). Obviously, the number of actors in the neighborhood
of actor i is identical to the degree of actor i (i is deﬁned
not to be a member of its own neighborhood). Now
deﬁne clustering of the neighborhood of i as the number
of edges in the neighborhood i as a fraction of the
maximum possible edges in that neighborhood. The lat-
ter is simply the number of combinations of two distinct
actors one can draw from a subset of k actors, where k
is the degree. Clustering at the level of the network as
a whole is then deﬁned as the average of clustering of
all neighborhoods i. Obviously, clustering is a direct
indicator for social capital, where high clustering indi-
cates high social capital.
A ﬁnal concept that will be necessary to set out the
theory of small worlds is that of a shortcut. Shortcuts
are edges that complete triads, or, alternatively, shortcuts
are edges that connect two vertices that would otherwise
be (widely) separated. We will use the parameter φ to
denote the fraction of edges in a graph that are shortcuts.
Clearly then, shortcuts are exactly the ‘bridges’ that ﬁll
in structural holes in a network member’s environment.
The fraction φ of such shortcuts or bridges in the total
of all connections can thus be seen as a degree of pres-
ence of the structural holes strategy in overall network
formation.
3.3. The theory of small worlds
We have already introduced the intuition that high
clustering goes hand in hand with long characteristic
path length, and vice versa. Mathematical work in net-
work theory (e.g., Watts, 2000) tends to support this
intuition. In fact, two speciﬁc network typologies have
attracted much attention, each representing one extreme
of the average clustering–characteristic path length
relation.
The ﬁrst typology is the so-called ‘connected caveman
world’. Such a world consists of a number of distinct
‘caves’ that are connected to each other by a single edge.
A cave is a subset of actors that is fully connected. Each
cave is connected to exactly two other caves by two dis-
tinct members, each of whom are connected to one other
actor in a different cave. In such a network, which is
depicted in Fig. 2, all paths to actors in the same cave
have the minimum length of 1, but paths to actors out-
side the cave are much longer because they depend on
only a few actors that can act as intermediaries. Since
the cave is almost fully connected internally, the degree
of clustering of this neighborhood is close to one. This
high clustering leads to a relatively high value for
characteristic path length (we will present values for
these two variables below).
The connected cavemen world is one that can be inter-
preted as emerging from pure social capital strategies.
The individual caveman obviously has a high amount of
social capital, because (s)he is a member of a densely
populated environment. However, the world is larger
than a single local environment (cave), and the high
resulting characteristic path length implies that the high
social capital comes hand in hand with a large average
distance to other parts of the world. This implies that it
would take a long time for information emerging in one
cave to spread through the world as a whole.
The other extreme network typology of interest is that
of the Moore Graph. This is a network in which every
vertex is adjacent to exactly k other vertices, and none
of these other vertices are connected to each other. The
Moore Graph is a purely theoretical construction, and
cannot even be obtained for many combinations of n and
k. This is why Fig. 2 only displays a local view around
a single vertex for the Moore Graph. It can easily be
veriﬁed that in the Moore Graph, clustering is zero, and
one may conclude that social capital strategies played no
role in network formation. On the other hand, there is
always a relatively efﬁcient path to other members of
the network, because every node is in fact operating as
a bridge.
The Moore Graph is of interest here because it puts
a lower limit on characteristic path length. An approxi-
mate expression for characteristic path length of the
Moore Graph with given n and k can be obtained, and
it can be shown (Watts, 2000, Sect. 4.1.2 and the refer-
ences there) that it is impossible to obtain shorter charac-
Fig. 2. The Connected Caveman World (left) and a local view of the
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teristic length for any graph with identical n and k pro-
vided that the degree of the individual vertices does not
differ too widely. Hence, the Moore Graph has much
lower characteristic path length than the Connected
Caveman World.
In practice, one can only approximate the perfect
Moore Graph by means of a graph in which the links
are distributed randomly. This will yield values for the
clustering coefﬁcient that are in fact positive, but very
close to zero. By drawing random graphs in which the
probability of shortcuts is varied, it is possible to con-
struct graphs that provide a more or less smooth tran-
sition between the highly clustered and long connected
caveman world and the short and not very highly clus-
tered Moore Graph. This will be shown below.
Summarizing, two main typologies of graphs have
been introduced: one for which the characteristic path
length is high, and hence information takes a long time
to travel from one (average) network member to another;
and one for which the characteristic path length is much
lower, and hence information travels much more rapidly.
The ‘long’ network is characterized by high clustering,
the short one by low clustering. The extreme case of
high clustering and long path length can be seen as a
representation of the pure social capital perspective on
network formation. The other extreme (short path length
and low clustering) can be seen as an extreme network
structure associated with the structural holes perspective.
Is the negative relationship between clustering and
length that results from comparing these two stereotypes
a general phenomenon?
It can be shown that high clustering and long charac-
teristic path length need not always go together. A spe-
cial class of networks can be identiﬁed in which clus-
tering is relatively high, but characteristic path length is
relatively short. This type of networks has been called
‘small worlds’ (Watts, 2000). This term has been derived
from the hypothesis that although most people in the
world mainly know other people that belong to a fairly
clustered set of friends, there are ﬁve to six intermedi-
aries necessary to connect the largest part of the popu-
lation of the globe. In other words, even though a person
knows mainly people in her own environment, she will
know indirectly most other people in the world through
only a small number of indirect steps.
Speciﬁcally, a small world has been deﬁned as a net-
work with n actors and average degree k that displays
characteristic path length approximately equal to a
Moore Graph with the same n and k, but has much larger
clustering than such a graph. The relevance of the idea
of small worlds becomes immediately obvious in the
context of the comparison of the structural holes per-
spective and the social capital perspective. Suppose one
would start from a situation of the connected cavemen
world, i.e., a world in which social capital dominates the
formation of networks completely. Then imagine that in
a controlled experiment, network members are allowed
to ﬁll in structural holes in their personal network, by
engaging in partnerships with ﬁrms in other parts of the
network. How would this affect the characteristic path
length of the network, and hence the efﬁciency of knowl-
edge transfer? How ‘many’ structural holes would have
to be ﬁlled before a certain degree of network efﬁciency
would be reached? It turns out the theory of small worlds
provides a very clear-cut answer to these questions.
In order to see how the small world is located in
between the Connected Caveman World and the Moore
Graph, Watts (2000) has proposed a number of formal
models describing the construction of (random) graphs.
The exact construction of these graphs need not concern
the reader here. What is interesting, however, is that
these networks can be tuned by the single parameter φ
to either side of the Connected Caveman World or the
Moore Graph. Moreover, this parameter has a clear
interpretation in terms of the structural holes perspective:
it measures the tendency for network connections to ﬁll
in structural holes. Fig. 3 illustrates the model.
The horizontal axis of Fig. 3 displays the parameter
φ , which tunes the graph, and which has an obvious
interpretation as the degree to which strategies aimed at
bridging structural holes play a role in partner seeking.
2
Fig. 3. Length and clustering as a function of the graph tuning para-
meter φ .
2 Instead of using φ , one may also use a slightly different parameter
denoted . This parameter measures the fraction of all pairs of edges
in the network that are not connected and have one and only one com-
mon neighbor. Such pairs of edges are called contractions, and can be
seen as an alternative conceptualization of the idea of bridges ﬁlling
in structural holes. Watts (2000, p. 73) argues that “ is an analogous
parameter to φ , although it is more general, as most shortcuts result
in contractions, but not the reverse”. In the networks depicted in Fig.
2, there is an exact quadratic relationship between φ and , which is568 B. Verspagen, G. Duysters / Technovation 24 (2004) 563–571
The ﬁgure shows that for a low fraction of shortcuts in
the set of the network’s edges, one observes a high value
for characteristic length of the network, and also a high
value for the clustering coefﬁcient of the network. This,
in other words, corresponds to the connected caveman
world network, or, alternatively, to a world in which
social capital completely dominates network formation.
At the other extreme, where the large majority of all
edges are shortcuts and the bridging of structural holes
is very important in strategy, one observes low values
for clustering and characteristic length. This corresponds
to the Moore Graph. Thus, we clearly ﬁnd support for
the intuition that a social-capital-dominated strategy
increases path length, while strategies aimed at bridging
structural holes decrease overall network length.
What is interesting, however, is that the path from
high to low values of φ , i.e., the path from a pure social
capital perspective to a pure structural holes perspective,
is quite different for the two variables in the graph. The
clustering coefﬁcient does not descend very much in the
beginning, but shows rapid decline towards the end.
Characteristic path length shows more or less the
opposite path: it declines rapidly at ﬁrst and reaches very
low levels already at relatively low levels of . Small
worlds are deﬁned as networks in the limited range (say
between 0.01 and 0.1) for which characteristic path
length is already at levels comparable with the Moore
Graph (right extreme), but the clustering coefﬁcient is
still relatively high. This world thus combines high
social capital with an efﬁcient ﬂow of information and
knowledge.
Note that the curves in Fig. 3 are drawn for some
speciﬁc values of other networks parameters. These are
the size of the network (number of vertices) and the
average number of direct connections that each of them
has (average degree). Also, the underlying model
assumes that the vertices do not differ too widely in their
actual degree (see Watts, 2000, Chaps. 3 and 4 for more
details). When applying the theory to a speciﬁc real-
world case, as will be done in the next section, violation
of this assumption may lead to observed values of ,
length and clustering that are off the curves.
Also, the model applied to draw Fig. 3 does not con-
tain any behavioral foundation. It is just a mathematical
construct useful to provide some benchmark against
which we can compare values of φ , length and clustering
observed in actual practice. The benchmark enables us
to assess how important the two network strategies
(structural holes and social capital) are in a real-world
governed by only one additional parameter. This is the so-called bundle
size, which is roughly equivalent to the number of parties involved in
a single partnership or alliance. However, because the quadratic term
in this relationship adds little for the values of n and k that characterize
the networks of interest in this paper, using φ or  is more or less
equivalent from a theoretical point of view.
case, and whether we ﬁnd values of path length and clus-
tering that are in broad accordance with these strategies.
Coming back to our research questions, the model
shows that very dense networks in which social capital
dominates network formation indeed lead to inefﬁcient
networks in terms of the overall speed of transmission
of knowledge ﬂows through the network. Compared to
this extreme case, the application by network members
of a strategy of trying to ﬁll structural holes will gener-
ally decrease characteristic path length, and hence facili-
tate knowledge ﬂows in the network as whole. The
theory also shows how frequently the structural holes
strategy needs to be applied in order to approach the
theoretical lower boundary on characteristic path length.
Speciﬁcally, the model suggests that the small worlds
range of the parameter φ is relatively efﬁcient. Forming
shortcuts beyond the upper limit of the small worlds
range does not lead to a noticeable further decrease of
characteristic path length, but it does decrease social
capital.
Note that this line of reasoning refers to overall net-
work path length and clustering. In any real-world net-
work there will be some ﬁrms with shorter (or longer)
path length. In other words, even in the small worlds
range, there will be an incentive for some ﬁrms to invest
further in alliances that ﬁll in structural holes in their
own local environment.
The analysis will now proceed by investigating how
the real-world networks of strategic technology alliances
compare against the benchmark theory.
4. Empirical results
We use the CATI database as our source of infor-
mation on strategic technology alliances. The data covers
alliances from the period 1980–1996. In constructing our
networks, we deﬁned two ﬁrms to be connected when
they are present in at least one joint alliance. A moving
window in time was used to date the networks, so that
the network at time t covers alliances in the period t–l
to t, where l+ 1 is the window length. We experimented
with l= 4, l= 2 and l= 17 (the latter means we include the
whole period for which we have alliances data). The
results are largely invariant to the value for l. The
alliances were also assigned to a technology ﬁeld, and
we made calculations for all technology ﬁelds together,
as well as two separate ﬁelds. In order to have sufﬁcient
observations, we deﬁned the two technology ﬁelds for
which separate calculations were done relatively
broadly. The two ﬁelds were chemicals and food, and
electricals (including electronics and ICT). When we
consider a network, we concentrate on the portion of the
network that is connected. In all cases, this involves by
far the largest proportion of ﬁrms that is present in the
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usually consist of a fairly high number of pairs of ﬁrms
that have only one alliance. Details on this are available
from the authors on request.
Table 1 gives an overview of the main results. All
ﬁve cases show a similar pattern: characteristic network
length (L) has the order of magnitude corresponding to
a Moore Graph, while the clustering parameter (γ ) has
an order of magnitude that is quite a lot higher than that
of a Moore Graph, although also somewhat lower than
that corresponding to the connected caveman world
(CCW). On the basis of these results, we can classify
the network of strategic alliances that we investigated as
small worlds.
The ﬁrst three lines consider the total network, i.e.,
no split-up has been made with regard to technology
ﬁeld. Here we see that the general tendency of a low
value for L and a fairly high value for γ is surprisingly
invariant to the value for l, although obviously the size
of the network depends on this. At the level of the two
separate technology ﬁelds, larger differences arise, as is
obvious from the two last lines in the table. Here we see
that the electricals ﬁeld is characterized by a relatively
low value for L, as compared to chemicals and food, as
well as the total network, although the value for γ is
quite similar for the two ﬁelds.
Fig. 4a–c show how, for the networks in Table 1 with
l= 4, the network structure compares to the benchmark
of a random network with varying φ , as in Fig. 3 above.
The ﬁgure gives both the theoretical network structure
(indicated by the lines) for n and K given for the speciﬁc
case in Table 1, and the observed values of L and γ
(dots). Hence the distance between the dots and the lines
is an indication of how much the observed network
structure differs from the theoretical one. Note that we
have no reason to expect that the observed values will
match the theoretical case, since the model used to con-
struct the latter is a random model without behavioral
basis. Thus, the theoretical lines cannot be seen as pre-
dictions, but rather as benchmarks corresponding to ‘ran-
dom partner seeking’. The deviations from these bench-
marks are then indications of strategic networking
behavior leading to a speciﬁc tendency for higher or
lower L and/or γ .
For the network for all technology ﬁelds, we observe
Table 1
Basic network statistics, networks of strategic alliances from CATI
Actual CCW Moore
φ nK L γ L γ L γ
Total, l= 4, t= 1996 0.406 1886 4.08 5.02 0.33 185.2 0.95 5.69 0.002
Total, l= 2, t= 1996 0.422 1300 3.82 5.34 0.30 134.5 0.94 5.75 0.002
Total, l= 17, t= 1996 0.330 5504 5.29 4.20 0.34 437.1 0.97 5.45 0.0008
Electricals, l= 4, t= 1996 0.295 837 4.75 3.75 0.28 72.37 0.97 4.45 0.004
Chemicals and food, l= 4, t= 1996 0.760 639 2.79 5.45 0.31 83.94 0.88 7.73 0.003
that the value for L is almost on the rightmost ﬂat part of
the benchmark line. Hence we conclude that somehow,
network length has been minimized, and the fraction of
shortcuts in the network (φ ) is a good predictor for this.
Clustering is somewhat higher than the benchmark
value, indicating a tendency for the building-up of
social capital.
The ﬁgure for electricals shows a somewhat similar
situation, although here the observed value for L is a bit
more below the benchmark. The value for clustering (γ ),
on the other hand is somewhat closer to the benchmark,
although still above. This again indicates a tendency for
strong social capital. For chemicals and food, the devi-
ation from the benchmark is most extreme. This is the
ﬁeld where the value for φ (shortcuts) is very high. The
benchmark would predict low clustering (low social
capital) on the basis of this, but the contrary is the case.
In this technology ﬁeld, clustering is almost as high as
the maximum value in the benchmark (for low φ ).
How can this be interpreted? The relatively high
values for clustering (γ ) can be taken as an indication of
the importance of social capital. On the other hand, the
relatively high values of φ and (partly as a result) low
value of L is an indication of strategic partner seeking
in line with a structural holes perspective on alliance
formation. In other words, the networks under consider-
ation seem to combine features of both theoretical per-
spectives that we have outlined above. The result of this
combination of perspectives is a network structure simi-
lar to a small world, in which information ﬂow is rela-
tively efﬁcient (low L), but social capital (γ ) still high.
How exactly these two strategies are combined in
terms of alliance formation is an issue that is open to
future research, which could possibly lead to a more
adequate (mathematical) model of network development.
Our results indicate that in such a theory, there would
certainly have to be a role for factors that are speciﬁc
to technology ﬁelds or industrial sectors. This is clear
from the large differences in networks in the two tech-
nology ﬁelds in Table 1, as well as from the observed
values for φ in these two ﬁelds. The electricals ﬁeld dis-
plays a value for φ that is broadly comparable to the
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Fig. 4. Network benchmark for the total network (l= 4, t= 1996), b:
Network benchmark for the network in electricals (l= 4, t= 1996). c:
Network benchmark for the network in chemicals and food (l= 4,
t= 1996).
hand, displays a much higher value for φ in combination
with a low degree of centrality.
Thus, the chemicals and food technology ﬁeld is one
in which a rather peculiar networking strategy is found.
Strategic partnering (φ ) is rather strong, and although,
according to our benchmark, this induces a smaller role
for social capital (low γ ), we ﬁnd exactly the opposite:
a high value for social capital (γ ). As a preliminary
explanation of this ﬁnding, one may point to the nature
of the knowledge base underlying this technology ﬁeld.
Especially in pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, the
close relations to science have induced an industry struc-
ture of many small ﬁrms, which are highly specialized
in research. Each of these ﬁrms covers a rather small
ﬁeld in a very in-depth way. Large companies tend to
focus their research on speciﬁc major diseases and have
adopted a strategy of tapping into this knowledge base
by means of many partnerships with these small special-
ized ﬁrms. Further research speciﬁcally on the compari-
son between partnering strategies in different industries
may obviously enlighten this issue more.
5. Conclusions
This paper has argued that the recent theory of small
worlds provides a natural way of uniting two perspec-
tives found in the strategic management literature on net-
works and strategic alliances. One perspective, that of
the theory of social capital, leads to a view in which
networks consist of densely connected local environ-
ments, corresponding to high values of social capital.
Firms are considered to seek such dense local environ-
ments in building their strategic alliances. The theory of
small worlds shows that in the extreme case of very
dense local environments, the ‘average’ path length for
knowledge ﬂows between two actors in the network
becomes very large. This can be considered as an
impediment to the efﬁcient spread of knowledge and
information within the network, and thus an undesirable
property both from the point of view of the networking
ﬁrm, and the policy point of view.
The other perspective found in the strategic manage-
ment literature is the one of structural holes. This theory
argues that ﬁrms will seek partnerships that form bridges
between their ‘own’ part of the network (local environ-
ment which may be densely connected) and other inter-
esting parts of the network. Rather then extending their
network based on an argument of enhancing social capi-
tal (i.e., dense local relations), ﬁrms are expected to pick
and choose partnerships based on the strategic position
of potential partners in the network. From a structural
holes perspective one might argue that ﬁrms should be
engaged in a strategy of bridging structural holes. This
will lead to short average path length in the network,
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The theory of small worlds provides a useful way of
representing the tendency for this ‘bridging behavior’ in
terms of a single parameter. This parameter measures
the number of ‘shortcuts’ (links that complete a triad)
as a fraction of all links in the network. The theory then
shows how the characteristics of the network in terms
of clustering (deﬁned as density of local environments)
and average path length of the network develop as a
function of this tendency. For very dense local environ-
ments (i.e., a world dominated by network ties resulting
from a social capital view of the world), average path
length is very long, while for extreme levels of ‘bridg-
ing’ (a ‘structural holes world’) path length approaches
a lower limit. In between these two extreme cases one
ﬁnds a small range of the bridging parameter for which
clustering is still relatively high, but average path length
is already close to the lower limit implied by the extreme
structural holes world. This is the range of ‘small
worlds’ as it has been deﬁned by Watts (2000). It is
argued here that these small worlds can be characterized
as relatively efﬁcient networks in terms of knowledge
transfer. In contrast to a pure structural holes or social
capital perspective, the small-worlds perspective is able
to assess the optimal conﬁguration of ties within cohes-
ive sub-groups and bridging ties.
The theory of small worlds thus enables us to compare
the efﬁciency of empirically observed networks to a
theoretical optimal conﬁguration of these networks. In
such an empirical application, the analysis has shown
that networks of strategic technology alliances between
large multinational ﬁrms indeed show small-worlds
properties. It can thus be concluded that these tech-
nology networks are relatively efﬁcient means of knowl-
edge transfer. When splitting our total network between
two distinct technology ﬁelds (chemicals and food, and
electricals, the latter including electronics and ICT), it
was found that especially the chemicals and food ﬁeld
shows ‘extreme’ properties of networking structure.
Here the fraction of shortcuts (i.e., bridge building) is
very high, while this still does not lead to a signiﬁcant
decline in social capital building.
As a suggestion for further work, we propose more
research into the relative role of social capital and bridge
building in network-partner seeking. The results summa-
rized above suggest that especially the chemicals and
food sector would be an important ﬁeld for this research.
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